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Abstract. The development of worldwide communications, along with
the dramatic increase of computational and storage capacities promise
numerous benefits for societies in the years to come. For these systems to
develop, security and privacy are necessary. This work presents a novel
protocol for privacy preserving network communications, using homo-
morphic cryptography. The malleability properties of homomorphic en-
cryption allows routing without ever disclosing the sender or receiver
of a message, while resisting against basic end-to-end attacks. We first
present our protocol in an abstract network model, and instantiate it for
ad-hoc networks as a use-case example.
Keywords: Privacy, Anonymous, Network, Communications, Routing,
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1 Introduction
Ubiquitous computing and worldwide communications are now part of the daily
life of many individuals. We expect from these systems availability and security
in order to provide reliable, confidential, and authenticated communications.
Since the Snowden revelations [12], we also expect these systems to provide
strong privacy. Nowadays, privacy preserving solutions are being adopted by a
wider public. The Tor network [8] is the most striking example, with more than
2 million users all over the world.
In general, in any information system, anyone can rightfully require her ac-
tions to stay private with respect to a set of chosen individuals. However, in a
censored or totalitarian regime, a nonconformist reporter needs privacy to ex-
ercise her freedom of speech and communicate with the outside. Indeed, the
simple fact of connecting to a blacklisted website or participating in a network
exposes her to serious consequences [4]. We focus on private communications
within contexts where privacy is a necessity.
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Anonymity and privacy for network communications begin with Chaum’s
MIX-nets [2]. They inspired a large portion of works in this field [7], although
some may differ by modifying the number of MIX nodes or points in their func-
tioning. Solutions introducing high latency between the sending of a packet and
its reception are in general more resistant to end-to-end attacks and traffic anal-
ysis than their low latency counterparts. On the other hand, they are not suited
for time-critical or interactive applications such as web surfing or SSH. For in-
stance, Tor [8] and more generally onion routing is a low-latency protocol, while
Mixminion [6] or MorphMix [20] are protocols aiming at resisting against end-
to-end attacks and thus induce high latency.
Our main contribution is to propose a routing protocol that allows strongly
private bidirectional interactive communication using homomorphic cryptogra-
phy. To the best of our knowledge, it is the first routing protocol relying on
this technology. By distributing the trust and using a proactive topology dissem-
ination, our protocol resists both internal and external passive adversaries. In
addition, our protocol not only hides the relation between senders and receivers,
but also decorrelates every message from its sender and receivers everywhere in
the network. We further provide an analysis of our protocol in terms of privacy,
and study its integration in a real-world example.
Using homomorphic cryptography is motivated by the limitation of tradi-
tional cryptography. Indeed, homomorphic encryption (HE) schemes allows to
publicly compute the encrypted value HEnc(f(m1,m2, . . . ,mk)) for some func-
tion f using the individual encryptions HEnc(mi) for i ∈ [0..k] [21]. Because they
are sufficient for our purposes, we solely consider partial HE schemes as Paillier
or Elgamal [11].
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Sect. 2 we present the re-
quired tools, our models, and privacy goals. The protocol itself is presented in
Sect. 3, while Sect. 4 discusses its properties and further improvements. Before
concluding, Sect. 5 investigates its integration in ad-hoc networks [3].
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Cryptographic tools
Homomorphic encryption. This work makes extensive use the Elgamal cryp-
tosystem [10], for its good efficiency compared to other partial schemes and its
scalar exponentiation capacity. To make this cryptosystem secure, it must work
within a group G where the Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) assumption holds,
i.e. in a group of prime order q. Typically, G ⊂ Z∗p is a subgroup of the multiplica-
tive group of prime order p = k.q+1 for some integer k. Keys are of the form (pk,
sk) = (h = gx, x) ∈ G× Zq where G = 〈g〉. The encryption of a message m ∈ G
is c = HEnc(pk,m) = (gr,m.hr) ∈ G2 for some random value r ∈ Zq. Elgamal
supports multiplication of ciphertexts HEnc(pk,m1) × HEnc(pk,m2) = (gr1+r2 ,
m1.m2.h
r1+r2) = HEnc(pk,m1.m2 mod p), scalar multiplication ScMult(m1,
HEnc(pk,m2)) = (g
r,m1.m2.h
r) = HEnc(pk,m1.m2 mod p), and scalar ex-
ponentiation ScExp(HEnc(pk,m1),m2) = (gr.m2 ,mm21 .h
r.m2) = HEnc(pk,mm21
mod p). Elgamal also supports re-randomisation: a ciphertext c = (c[0], c[1])
for some message can be turned into a different looking, randomly distributed
ciphertext for the same message: ReRand(pk, c) = (c[0].gr
′
, c[1].hr
′
).
Threshold homomorphic encryption. This work also uses a threshold homomor-
phic encryption (THE) scheme [5]. This type of homomorphic scheme can have
its secret keys split into parts and distributed among several entities. As a result,
for some threshold t, t entities or more can collaboratively decrypt ciphertexts,
but less than t entities do not learn anything on the underlying plaintexts. In
practice, key generation is performed by an authority who publicizes the public
key and distributes shares of the secret key. Encryption is performed as usual,
but decryption requires at least t share holders: each one locally decrypts the ci-
phertext using its share, and the outputs are then combined to recover the plain-
text. Although any THE scheme may be suitable, this work uses the threshold
variant of Paillier from Damgård et al. [5]. We denote encryption, decryption
using a share, and combining primitives of a THE scheme by THEnc(pk,m),
THDec(share, c), and THComb(cˆ1, . . . , cˆt).
Note that in the rest of the paper, standard public-key encryption (PKE) is
denoted by Enc, and symmetric-key encryption using key K is denoted {·}K .
2.2 Models and Goals
In the rest of the paper, we denote the node initiating a connection source,
and its intended receiver destination. We should however mention that once
the connection is established, information may flow in both directions. Nodes
between a source and a destination relay the messages on a multi-hop path. We
call amessage any data transiting through the network, whether it is application-
level data or routing information.
Distributed trust. We rely on a distributed trust model, where any node may
initiate, relay or be the receiver of a connection. By distributing the routing
and removing all hierarchy among the nodes, we limit the consequences of node
corruption. As there is no central network entity nor dedicated relays, corrupting
a node brings very little power on the network as a whole. Actually, in our
model, a node is unable to make use of the routing information on its own to
run the protocol: it must collaborate with other network member. This suggests
a corrupted node alone can not break the privacy of our protocol.
Privacy Goals. We refer to Pfitzmann and Köhntopp [19] to define the concept of
unlinkability in our setting: two items of interest are unlinkable if the adversary
is unable to distinguish whether they are related or not. Using this terminology,
we aim at ensuring the following properties.
Source/message unlinkability (SMU) Given a message m and a node S, it
is impossible to distinguish whether S is the source of m or not;
Destination/message unlinkability (DMU) Given a message m and a node
D, it is impossible to distinguish whether D is the destination of m or not;
Source/destination unlinkability (SDU) Given two nodes, it is impossible
to distinguish whether they communicated or not;
Message/message unlinkability (MMU) Given two messages, it is impossi-
ble to distinguish whether they belong to the same source-destination pair
communication or not;
Adversary Model. We consider two adversary models: a passive, non-collusive
adversary internal to the network (also called honest-but-curious) (AdvI), and
a global eavesdropper (AdvII). The first type of adversary participates in the
network and is compliant with the protocol, but tries to get as much knowledge
as possible on the network and other nodes. The second is still passive but
more powerful, although it does not participate in the network. We do not give
the adversary the ability to tamper with the network by dropping, replaying,
or performing DoS or Sybil attacks for instance. Note that when considering
information theoretic adversaries, notably against cryptographic primitives, we
use the probabilistic polynomial-time (PPT) model. In any case, the goal of the
adversary is to break the properties stated above.
Non-goals. We do not intend to provide an implementation-ready, nor an efficient
protocol. Our first goal is to design a routing protocol for interactive communica-
tions achieving as much privacy as possible, and to extract interesting properties
from it. Improvements in terms of efficiency and routing optimizations belong
to future work. At last, protecting messages at the application level, although
necessary, is outside the scope of this work. In particular, to resist against finger-
printing techniques on the Internet[17], content and identity should be protected
end-to-end using SSL, application-level anonymization proxy or similar tools.
3 The protocol
Bearing in mind the desired privacy properties, we aim at designing a protocol
that constructs and uses routes so that any node can contact any others at
any time. This section describes our solution in two steps: it first shows how to
disseminate topology without using nodes’ identities, and then how the routing
information is used to allow message sending.
3.1 Infrastructure
Initially, we consider an abstract network model where nodes are randomly
placed and connected to their neighbors through a bare physical medium. Prior
to describing our protocol, we introduce several values associated to a node X.
– IDX: X’s network identity. It is a random value chosen by X prior to network
setup, typically extracted from a large public set so that collisions between
two nodes’ identifiers occur with negligible probability. Generally speaking,
nodes are willing to keep their identity concealed to other network members.
– (pkpermX , sk
perm
X ): the permanent key pair of X, possibly certified or publicly
linked to X’s identity.
– (pkX, skX): one of X’s temporary key pairs, decorrelated from X’s identity.
A node may own many temporary keys and dynamically generate them.
– srcX: a value generated by X and used in its routing activity as a source (or
relay) node. This value is unconditionally kept secret by X.
– dstX: a value generated by X and used in its routing activity as a destination
node. This value is unconditionally kept secret by X.
We assume that prior to network setup, nodes willing to communicate ex-
changed their respective network identifiers, long term public keys, and possibly
some auxiliary information, in the same manner as PGP keys are exchanged.
In a very constrained context such as a censorship, a very high latency but
highly private and secure protocol allowing the transport of small data, such as
MIAB [14], can be used.
3.2 Routing while concealing identities
As we aim at concealing every node’s identity, the main challenge we have to
face is to transport a message to its intended recipient without knowing its
actual identity. More exactly, we need to find a solution to route without network
members knowing other nodes’ network-wide identities. For this, we introduce
the notion of local identifiers: instead of using a destination D’s identity IDD
to designate it, a node X uses a value derived from values belonging to D and
itself. This value is collaboratively computed by X and D upon creation of the
route. It should allow X to route messages towards D, but must prevent X from
making the link with IDD. We denote this value LocalIDXD and define it as:
LocalIDXD = IDD.g
srcX.dstD , where 〈g〉 = G
Because most of our operations are performed within the Elgamal group G ⊂ Z∗p,
the local identifiers and more generally all values in our protocol are computed
modulo p (unless specified otherwise).
The local identifiers resolve the question of destination addressing. However,
we also need a way for node to forward messages towards some local identifier
on a multi-hop path. Indeed, message must travel from node to node in order to
reach its destination. This implies that nodes must be able to address specific
neighbors, still without knowing their identities. To enable private neighborhood
discovery, we borrow a technique from Zhang et al. [22]. It consists, for every
pair of neighboring node in the network, in engaging in a Diffie-Hellman (DH)
handshake in order to obtain a common secret, and to derive symmetric keys and
link identifiers from this secret using cryptographic key derivation functions. A
link identifier between two nodes X and Y, denoted LX,Y or LY,X indifferently,
acts as a MAC address in a traditional LAN. The key KX,Y associated to LX,Y
serves to encrypt the message on the link. The particularity of this construction
is that link identifiers and keys are only used one time. New ones are generated
S X Y D
ga,HEnc(pkD, g
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Fig. 1. Topology dissemination in a toy network.
for each message (without the need for a new handshake), in such a way that it
is impossible to relate two links (or keys) stemming from the same handshake.
We now describe how to disseminate the topology without revealing any
node identity. The general idea works as follows: when a node knows a route,
it proposes this route to its neighbors. Said otherwise, it offers its neighbors
to forward messages towards some destination for them. We make use of the
elements defined above, and store routing information into two different tables:
a Destination Route Table (DRT) and a Forwarding Route Table (FRT). To
explain how these tables are filled, we use the example from Fig. 1 depicting a
toy network of 4 nodes in a row.
In a first phase (in blue), D broadcasts to all its neighbors a route proposal :
it proposes itself as destination. The goal of this route proposition is to make
neighboring nodes aware of D and compute their local identifiers towards D.
For this, the neighboring node Y generates a random number r, and computes
ScMult
(
r, ScExp(HEnc(pkD, g
dstD ), srcY )
)
using the homomorphic properties of
Elgamal. It sends a re-randomization of the result so as to ensure the ciphertext
looks random, and a second half of a DH handshake (encrypted, to avoid man-
in-the-middle attacks). D decrypts the ciphertext, computes IDD.r.gdstD.srcY =
r.LocalIDYD and sends the result back using the newly generated link identifier
and key. Y recovers r.LocalIDYD and simply multiplies by (r
−1 mod p). After
these exchanges, D inserts a new entry in its FRT: 〈LD,Y ,KD,Y , null〉. The null
value indicates the end of a route, and allows D to know that it is the intended
receiver of messages incoming from the link LD,Y. As for Y, it inserts an entry in
its DRT: 〈LocalIDYD, LY,D,KY,D, pkD,ReRand(pkD,HEnc(pkD, gdstD ))〉, where
the last value is simply a re-randomized copy from D’s first message.
In the second phase (in green), Y proxies the route proposal from D to its
own neighbors. D silently discards the proposal upon noticing it is the destina-
tion. The protocol is then very similar, except that the handshake is handled
somewhat differently, and that Y must act as proxy between X and D because
D is the only node able to decrypt X’s answer. After the exchanges, Y inserts in
its FRT 〈LX,Y ,KX,Y , LocalIDYD〉, and X insert in its DRT 〈LocalIDXD , LX,Y ,
KX,Y , pkD,ReRand(pkD,HEnc(pkD, g
dstD ))〉.
Local id Link id Key Dest. pk Route prop.
LocalIDYD L
(1)
Y,D K
(1)
Y,D pkD HEnc(pkD, g
dstD )
LocalIDYX L
(1)
Y,X K
(1)
Y,X pkX HEnc(pkX , g
dstX )
LocalIDYS L
(2)
Y,X K
(2)
Y,X pkS HEnc(pkS , g
dstS )
Destination Table
Link id Key Local id
L
(2)
Y,D K
(2)
Y,D null
L
(3)
Y,X K
(3)
Y,X null
L
(3)
Y,D K
(3)
Y,D LocalID
Y
X
L
(4)
Y,D K
(4)
Y,D LocalID
Y
S
L
(4)
Y,X K
(4)
Y,X LocalID
Y
D
Forwarding Table
Link ids with different parenthesized exponents stem from two different DH handshakes.
Fig. 2. Routing tables of Y after topology dissemination
This procedure is repeated, X proposing the route to S and X and Y proxying
S’s answer. In the general case, the procedure is repeated until the whole network
is aware of D’s presence. Furthermore, all nodes self-propose in the same manner
as D to advertise their presence. As a result, each node’s presence in the network
will eventually be known by all, while its identity remains undisclosed. In our
example, Y’s tables are eventually filled as described in Fig. 2.
Using regular timeouts for table entries, and by repeating the proposals pe-
riodically, tables can be updated in case a node leaves or moves in the network.
Although the complexity of this topology dissemination method is considerable
(at least quadratic in the number of nodes in the network), it is only necessary
to run it once at network setup.
3.3 Sending a message
At this point, each node has at least one route towards every other node. Note
that completely anonymous communications are possible: the two tables allow
any two nodes in the network to connect to each other using local identifiers.
However, nodes can not know who they are connecting with, and the tables do
not directly allow a source to reach a specific destination of its choice.
In order to allow connection of S to D without breaching privacy, S and D not
being 1 hop neighbors, our solution makes S ask for help to another node. Also,
we use a THE scheme with threshold t = 2 and make the assumption that there
exist a pair of keys (pk∗, sk∗) for this scheme such that pk∗ is publicly known,
but sk∗ is unknown to all network members. However, every node X owns a
share of the decryption key, shX. The key pair and shares can be generated by
a third party for instance. Finally, we suppose that, in addition to its identity
and public key, D gave S the auxiliary value THEnc(pk∗, dstD).
Figure 3 describes the message sequence for S to be able to send a mes-
sage msg to D. The first phase (in blue) is called route initialization: this is
the part where S and X cooperate using THE to find a route from X to D1.
Before running this protocol, S generates a random number r and computes
C = ReRand(pk∗,ScMult(r,THEnc(pk∗, dstD))). S and X then use their respec-
tive decryption shares shS and shX to cooperatively decrypt C. X obtains a
1 In the general case, S can choose any node in the network to play the role of X.
S X Y D
LS,X , {C = THEnc(pk∗, r.dstD),
THDec(shS , C)}KS,X
LX,S , {C′ = HEnc(pkX , gr.dstD.srcX ), pkX}KX,S
LS,X , {HEnc(pkX , LocalIDXD ),
Enc(pkpermD ,msg)}KS,X
LX,Y , {Enc(pkpermD ,msg)}KX,Y
LY,D, {Enc(pkpermD ,msg)}KY,D
Fig. 3. S sends a message to D.
blinded value of dstD, v = r.dstD, by using the THComb primitive. X then com-
putes in the clear (gsrcX)v, encrypts it under one of its keys using Elgamal, and
sends back the result C ′. If r and p − 1 are co-prime, applying ReRand(pkX,
ScMult(IDD,ScExp(C
′, r−1 mod (p − 1)))) on the ciphertext C ′ received by S
yields a random-looking encryption of LocalIDXD, which X is able to decrypt. X
looks up in its DRT for a route towards this local identifier, and forwards the
payload encrypted under D’s permanent key. The second phase (in green) simply
consists in table look ups. Upon receiving the message, Y looks up in its FRT to
find the entry corresponding to LX,Y. Y recovers the relevant local identifier from
this entry, looks up in its DRT for a route toward it, and forwards accordingly.
If at any moment, a table look up fails, a notification is sent back. D knows it is
the destination thanks to the null value in its FRT entry corresponding to LY,D.
4 Discussion
This section explains our technical choices, analyses our protocol, and discusses
its properties.
4.1 Interaction and THE in route initialization
In our model, the interaction in the route initialization is necessary in order to
ensure DMU. Indeed, because of the way routes are built, the same local identi-
fiers may be used both to emit or to forward a message to a given destination.
Suppose a source S could, on its own, find a route towards a specific destina-
tion D, i.e. S can find the value LocalIDSD in its DRT and knows it actually
designates D. Later on, if S is asked to forward a message towards the same
destination D, S will use the value LocalIDSD (as explained in Sect. 3.3). Thus,
S will infer the message is for D and break DMU. Therefore, for DMU to hold,
a source S must not be able to initiate a communication alone.
The most straightforward solution is for S to hand all its messages to some
other node X, and for X to forward messages towards the actual destination D.
This means that X must find the relevant LocalID to send the messages to, but
for DMU to hold, it must not uncover the actual intended destination. For the
same reason, S must not make the link between IDD and LocalIDSD. In other
words, through an oblivious interaction with S, X must learn LocalIDXD.
We argue that to achieve secure computation of LocalIDXD, a strong assump-
tion need to be done: every node must possess a universal auxiliary information
on the network. That is to say, a value that does not relate to a particular node,
but on the contrary relates to all nodes. We actually show in appendix of this
paper, that without such auxiliary information, an efficient and secure route ini-
tialization is impossible in our model2. In a nutshell, if we do not use universal
auxiliary information, we show that, because X can not use any knowledge it has
on D (else X would know the intended destination beforehand, which is absurd),
X does not bring any input to the computation of LocalIDXD except srcX. This
means that S must know the rest of the inputs necessary to compute it, i.e. S
knows IDD and dstD. Therefore, S can compute LocalIDSD by itself, and break
DMU as explained above. The proposed solution is to give the power to S and
X to compute together something they could not compute by themselves. We
achieve this via a piece of information that each node keeps secret, different for
each node and useless by itself, but when several pieces are combined, they pro-
duce a necessary input to all LocalID values. In practice, we instantiate these
auxiliary information by shares of a secret key of a THE scheme.
4.2 Privacy analysis
Our protocol, as described in the previous section, is still vulnerable to many end-
to-end attacks and traffic analysis. To prevent them, we fix a constant message
size3 and we borrow techniques from MIX networks such as the introduction of
random delays and message batching [7]. These techniques unfortunately incur a
loss of performances under the form of additional latency. We reject the insertion
of dummy messages, for their prohibitive cost compared to the additional privacy
they provide [18].
Preliminary properties Intuitively, our design ensures the following properties:
(1) By construction, routes are partially disjoint : for a given source-destination
pair there may exist several routes, and for two different source-destination
pairs, routes may overlap. Thus, in Fig. 4, Z can not know whether messages
come from S1 or S2, as the link identifier is the same for both routes.
(2) If the Decisional DH assumption holds and secure cryptographic key deriva-
tion functions exist, link identifiers are secure: for a given pair of neighboring
nodes (X, Y), link messages are unlinkable for AdvI and AdvII. That is to
say, the pairs (L(1)X,Y,K
(1)
X,Y) and (L
(2)
X,Y,K
(2)
X,Y) stemming from two different
DH handshakes are unlinkable.
2 There is a way to achieve route initialization by performing an exhaustive search in
both S and X’s DRTs, but this yields a quadratic complexity in the number of nodes.
3 Large messages are split into several ones, and padding is used if necessary.
S1 W
S2 X
Y Z D
A B
Fig. 4. An example of partially disjoint routes
(3) The local identifiers are secure: for all X and D, LocalIDXD is known only
to X; if the Computational DH assumption holds, given LocalIDXD it is not
possible to recover the inputs that formed it; and if the DDH assumption
holds, for any X, D1, D2, LocalIDXD1 and LocalID
X
D2
, X is unable to know
which local identifier points to which destination.
(4) Route propositions are indistinguishable for AdvI. Because, locally, the mes-
sages exchanged are the same in both cases, whether a route proposition
emanated from the destination itself or a proxy is indistinguishable for AdvI.
(5) If route propositions are indistinguishable for AdvI, if the encryption schemes
used are semantically secure, if the link identifiers are secure, and if we use
MIXing techniques in the route proposal, then up to a certain point, AdvII
can not distinguish whether a proposition emanated from the destination or
a proxy4.
(6) If local identifiers are secure, route initialization is oblivious for AdvI. Indeed,
S never makes the link between D and its value LocalIDSD, and V never learns
that the destination is D. In addition, the blinding factor r hides dstD and
if the discrete logarithm problem is hard, srcX is concealed.
(7) If we use MIXing techniques, and if link identifiers are secure, route initial-
ization is indistinguishable from standard communication for AdvII.
Proof sketches of these properties are available in appendix. We merely note
here that property 3 seem to hold for the same reason that Elgamal is seman-
tically secure. Indeed, LocalIDXD can be seen as an Elgamal encryption of IDD
under key dstD using randomness srcX. However, the proof can not be the same,
as in our case, the random coins srcX are known to X.
Privacy properties Assuming the properties stated above hold, our protocol ful-
fills our privacy goals. We provide proof sketches in appendix.
– SMU holds against
• AdvI, because messages are exempt from any direct or indirect infor-
mation on the source or its location in the network.
• AdvII, if we introduce MIXing techniques in the forwarding process and
properties 2 and 7 hold.
– DMU holds against
4 Up to a certain point, because when the proxy is far from the destination, a basic
timing analysis is sufficient to distinguish the two cases.
• AdvI, if properties 3, 4 and 6 hold, and if the encryption schemes are
receiver-anonymous [15].
• AdvII, if properties 2 and 5 hold, and if the destination, upon receiving
a message, simulates a relay.
– SDU holds against AdvI and AdvII if SMU or DMU hold.
– MMU holds against
• AdvI, if property 1 holds. Except in the special case of node X in Fig. 3.
• AdvII, if property 2 holds.
4.3 Shortcomings and future improvements
The above analysis is mainly intuitive. Formal proofs are desirable in order to
confirm that the privacy goals are met. For this, the framework of Hevia and
Micciancio [13] provides a formal definition of source, destination and/or message
unlinkability against adversary models that are very close to ours.
Because we mainly focused on privacy, our solution is neither efficient nor
optimized. In particular, it does not give any guarantee on the connectivity of
the network, it does not manage route lifetimes, does not handle routing loops
and does not limit the size of the routes. For a practical routing algorithm,
mechanisms handling those points are necessary. The difficulty is to design such
mechanisms while preserving privacy.
Our protocol is vulnerable to active attacks. To port security against active
internal non-collusive adversaries, it has to be modified so that homomorphic
evaluations performed by one party can be verified by another. For this, one
may use homomorphic message authentication codes, which certify that some
ciphertext stem from the correct homomorphic computation [1].
Also, our protocol is vulnerable to a collusion of merely 2 nodes. For instance,
if S and X collude in the route initialization protocol, they uncover the secret
value dstD of D and S eventually break DMU. To resist against a collusion of t
nodes, we can ask the relay nodes between S and X (assuming X is not neighbor
to S) to participate in the threshold decryption protocol.
It would also be interesting to remove the strong assumption of universal
auxiliary information. Indeed, although it is acceptable for particular contexts,
assuming that each node owns a share of a common secret is unrealistic in gen-
eral. As we have seen, in our solution, this hypothesis is necessary to obtain an ef-
ficient route initialization. A solution is to distribute the secret and secret shares
generation, but in this case, the dynamic insertion of nodes is very complex.
Other choices, models or assumptions might allow circumventing the impossibil-
ity result while enabling efficient route initialization. For instance, decorrelating
the activities of sources and relays, so as to avoid issues raised in Sect. 4.1, would
remove the need for interaction and universal auxiliary information.
At last future work should focus on testing the protocol against typical net-
work attacks, and to assess the practical usability of our design measuring effi-
ciency, available bandwidth and scalability through simulations.
5 Adaptation to a real-wold example: ad-hoc networks
We defined our protocol in a general, abstract network. As in our model, a simple
physical medium is necessary, our protocol can work on top of any bare network
graph. Indeed, no infrastructure nor any specific routers are required for our
protocol to be deployed. Now, this section investigates how our protocol can be
instantiated to a real world example. Because of the similarities with our model,
we envision an adaptation to ad-hoc networks [3].
Indeed, these networks are infrastructure-less: there is no central node(s),
and the routing is completely distributed. Ad-hoc routing protocols are either
reactive or proactive. In the formers, routes are created only when necessary in an
on-demand fashion while the others behave more as IP routing, where topology
is flooded in the network. Although anonymous reactive routing designs are
overwhelming, proactive ones are quite rare [16]. The few we are aware of either
make assumptions we reject such as the presence of nodes willing to disclose their
identities, or provide only a weak form of privacy (but better efficiency). Our
solution stands out by its proactive nature, by the strong privacy it provides,
and by the use of homomorphic cryptography, which has never been used before
in ad-hoc networks.
Ad-hoc networks allow a smooth integration of our protocol. Indeed, we can
directly work above the MAC layer, assuming that nodes are able to function in
promiscuous mode and to set their address to the broadcast address. Thus, nodes
always use MAC broadcasting to communicate, and link identifiers to address
specific neighbors, as described originally by Zhang et al. [22]. Thanks to the
broadcast nature of ad-hoc networks, privacy is even re-enforced. Indeed, when
a node emits a message using link identifiers, AdvII can not even know which
neighbor was addressed. This is not the case with wired networks, where links
are point-to-point.
If we envision an adaptation to ad-hoc networks, the main shortcoming of
our protocol is its inefficiency. The cost of cryptographic primitives is prohibitive
for ad-hoc network nodes, which are typically small devices with limited battery
power. At last, for an adaptation to mobile ad-hoc networks (MANETs), we
have to take in account the nodes’ mobility, which might cause route exhaustion
and imprecise knowledge of the neighborhood. To deal with frequent topology
changes, a trivial yet inefficient solution is to increase the frequency of route
proposals. Another possibility is to rely on the fact that, as several routes are
created from each source-destination pair, there will always be a valid route.
6 Conclusion
This preliminary work lays the foundations for strongly private network com-
munications using homomorphic encryption. We presented a privacy preserving
routing protocol suitable for distributed environments, exhibited its main fea-
tures, and provided a partial proof of its privacy properties. As practical use-case,
we showed that an adaptation to ad-hoc networks is at hand.
Many points need to be addressed, and several others can be improved. In
particular, future work will include advanced experimentations to attest the gain
in privacy provided by our protocol and its efficiency. Even though we do not
expect our protocol to perform as good as the state-of-the-art, we assume our
users are willing to trade some efficiency against strong privacy (a feature often
lacking in presently deployed solutions5). If possible, privacy properties should
be proved formally, but how to do so is still an open question. Even technologies
already widely deployed, which benefit from years of experience, regularly suffer
attacks. Of course, we do not intend to replace these solutions, but merely to
complete them. We see our work as a proof of concept for new strongly private
interactive communications, offering free communications in any circumstances.
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A Correctness and performances of arithmetic operations
Our design makes extensive use of Elgamal, and most of the cryptographic operations
are performed within the Elgamal group G. For instance, in order to take full advantage
of the scheme’s homomorphic properties, the local identifiers and the node identities
need to belong to the same space as the ciphertexts. This is a non-standard use of
Elgamal: usually, messages belong to Zq, and a message encoding function from Zq to
G is applied to them. In our case, messages are directly taken in G. Furthermore, the
arithmetic operations we use often modify both the Elgamal ciphertext and the un-
derlying plaintext. The most representative example is the modular root computation
during the route initialization, that takes place inside a ciphertext.
To check the correctness of our computations, and more specifically of the ScMult
and ScExp functions and the modular root, we developed a simple PHP script6. By
programming an encoding-free version of Elgamal, we successfully verified that the
computation of the local identifiers in the route proposal and initialization protocols
yield the right output. The choice of the language was motivated by the facility and
rapidity to develop with PHP. The code should not, in any case, be considered secure
or be used for any other purpose than checking correctness of the arithmetic operations
involved in the protocol.
Although a highly non-optimized coding, we report in Table 1 the timings for a toy
instantiation of Elgamal with security parameter λ = 10, without taking in account any
notion of communication delay. The threshold decryption phase is also not represented.
Table 2 compares the running times of the C++ (with the GMP library) and the
PHP modular exponentiation algorithm on the same test platform. The results show
that we can hope augmenting performances by a factor of at least 50, 000 in future
implementations.
Table 1. Running times of poof-of-concept PHP implementation for λ = 10.
KeyGen Enc Dec Ctxt mult. ScMult ScExp ReRand Rt prop. Rt init.
47.46ms 0.14ms 0.24ms 0.13ms 0.07ms 0.13ms 0.20ms 1.32ms 1.25ms
Table 2. Comparison of PHP and C++ modular exp. running times for λ = 20.
C++ (GMP lib) PHP
0.0008ms 54ms
B Proof of privacy properties
This appendix gives arguments towards proving that our protocol achieves the privacy
goals stated in Sect. 4.2, by first showing that the seven properties from the same
section hold.
These “proofs” are merely written arguments, sometimes making reference to hard
problems in cryptography, such as the discrete logarithm problem. Indeed, although
there exists metrics or formal tools for anonymity in network communications, we reject
their use here (mainly because our work is preliminary).
In [9], the authors measure anonymity by modeling the knowledge of the adversary
with respect to some event (e.g. the sending of a message) as a probability distribution
6 Available at https://github.com/aguellier/elgamal-for-private-comm
on the nodes’ identities. This probability distribution is then compared to the uniform
probability distribution by computing the difference of their Shanon entropy. As the
authors themselves underline, the metric suffers from several shortcomings. First, it
gives no indications so as to generating the adversary’s knowledge, and although it is
straightforward in small examples, this task is uneasy in general. Secondly, the adver-
sary’s auxiliary information is not taken into account. For instance, the adversary may
know that Alice and Bob participate in the network, and that they are likely to com-
municate. We add to these facts that setting the threshold of entropy difference above
which the privacy is considered broken is unclear. Furthermore, whether the threshold
should be chosen depending on the number of nodes, the density of the network, or the
number of corrupted nodes is also an open question. At last, in our case, identities are
not disclosed at all, so the probability distribution modeling the adversary’s knowledge
can not be based on them.
Another measure of privacy as been proposed by Hevia and Micciancio under the
form of a cryptographic framework [13]. They define privacy properties in a very formal
way, and express security through cryptographic games and in terms of indistinguisha-
bility. Their model seems is close to ours, and their framework seems suited to our
setting. However, the authors do not give any clue towards using it. And in the general
case, it is unclear how to use their game-based security definition.
For all these reasons, we will settle for rather informal proofs, reasoning at a high
level.
B.1 Preliminaries
When possible security properties are formalized via game-based security definitions.
In those definitions, the adversary is denoted A. The oracle for a function or primitive
f(x) is notedOf(·). An adversary having access to the oracle for function f is denoted
AOf(·) .
B.2 Preliminary properties
This section considers the seven properties from Sect. 4.2 and discusses them one by
one.
Property 1 By construction, routes are partially disjoint: for a given source-destination
pair there may exist several routes, and for two different source-destination pairs, routes
may overlap. Thus, in Fig. 4, Z can not know whether messages come from S1 or S2,
as the link identifier is the same for both routes.
This property simply follows from observations on how routes are constructed.
We refer to Fig. 4 in the following paragraph. Using the route proposal sub-protocol
described in Sect. 3.2, the routes were constructed in the following order:
– First, D proposed itself to its neighbor. Z learned here the value LocalIDZD, and
D and Z formed the link LZ,D.
– Then, Z proposed this newly learned route to its own neighbors. For each neighbor,
a different link identifier was formed: LY,Z and LB,Z .
– In a third phase, B and Y simultaneously proposed their newly learned route to
D. The new links are then LX,Y and LA,B .
– After two more steps, S1 and S2 were aware of D.
Now, we can see that: (i) two sources may share a portion of route towards the same
destination, and (ii) one source may have several routes towards the same destination.
For (i), there are two examples: S1 and S2 share the links LY,Z and LZ,D. In Fig. 4,
the links for the green route and the blue dashed one are noted differently, but all
links drawn between Y and Z are designated by the same link identifier LY,Z (the same
goes for links between Z and D). Therefore, whether a message was originally sent by
S1 or S2, Z receives it from the same link identifier, and forwards it on the same link
identifier. The second example is the portion of route between Z and D, shared between
the dashed blue route coming from S1 and the dotted one coming from S2. But in this
case, Z can make the difference between a message from S1, which arrives from LY,Z ,
and a message from S2, which arrives from LB,Z .
Concerning the second fact (ii), we have an example with S1. It has a route using
X, and another using A. This means messages from the same communication between
S1 and D may take each a different path, and a corrupted node on one route will only
see a fraction of the communication.
Property 2 If the Decisional DH assumption holds and secure cryptographic key
derivation functions exist, link identifiers are secure: for a given pair of neighboring
nodes (X, Y), link messages are unlinkable for AdvI and AdvII. That is to say, the
pairs (L(1)X,Y,K
(1)
X,Y) and (L
(2)
X,Y,K
(2)
X,Y) stemming from two different DH handshakes are
unlinkable.
As the link identifier structure is borrowed from a construction by Zhang et al. [22],
we refer to their work. Note however that the authors, in order to achieve authentication
during the neighbor discovery phase, make use of an external trusted third party and
a bilinear map. As authentication is not a goal for us, we solely need regular Diffie-
Hellman handshakes and cryptographic key derivation functions (KDF). Assuming the
DH handshake led to the common value S, in our protocol, two neighboring nodes (X,
Y) compute their i-th key and link identifier as LX,Y = KDF(S, salt, 2i) and KX,Y =
KDF(S, salt, 2i+1). Therefore, if the Decisional DH assumption holds and KDF exists,
the generation of link identifiers is secure in our sense. Indeed, the secret S can only
be known by X and Y, thus they are the only ones able to generate such links. If the
KDF is collision resistant, a different handshake or a different index i lead to different
links and keys. If the KDF is one-way (or pre-image resistant), it is impossible for a
PPT adversary to find v given H(v), thus the secret S can not be found. Finally, if
the KDF is pseudo-random, the link and key for index i and the ones for index i + 1
both look random (to a PPT adversary), and are thus unlinkable. In the same way, the
links and keys for two different DH handshakes are computationally indistinguishable
from random, and are thus unlinkable (even for the entities that performed the DH
handshake).
Property 3 The local identifiers are secure: for all X and D, LocalIDXD is known only
to X; if the Computational DH assumption holds, given LocalIDXD it is not possible to
recover the inputs that formed it; and if the DDH assumption holds, for any X, D1, D2,
LocalIDXD1 and LocalID
X
D2 , X is unable to know which local identifier points to which
destination.
Prior to formalizing the security definition of local identifiers, we abstract their
structure. For this, we give an abstract definition of the computation of local identi-
fiers in 3 steps, as in the route proposition. The first and last steps are made by the
destination, while the second is made by the source (or relay) node. We denote by
Gen : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}∗ the function taking in input the security parameter λ and gen-
erating the public parameters pp, including the sets X , Y ′ and Z. By Comp1 : X → Y
we denote the ideal function computing the first step of the local identifiers compu-
tation on the destination side. Comp2 : X × Y → Y is the ideal function computing
the second step, on the source side. And Comp3 : Y × Y → Z is the ideal function
computing the third step, on the destination side. We write LocalIDXD = Comp3(yD,
Comp2(xX ,Comp1(xD))), where xD ∈ X is the input of X, and xD ∈ X and yD ∈ Y
are the inputs of D. For simplicity, we define Comp : X ×X × Y → Z as Comp(x1, x2,
y) := Comp3(y,Comp2(x2,Comp1(x1)).
We say a local identifier structure is secure if the following properties hold for all
nodes X and D:
– Pairness: LocalIDXD depends on values generated by X and D only. If LocalIDX
D
=
Comp(x,, x2, y), then x1, x2 and y belong to one of X and D, and are secret to this
node.
– Secrecy : LocalIDXD must be known by X only.
– Collaborative oblivious computation: For all X and for all D 6= X, LocalIDXD can
not be computed by a network entity by itself, and must be the result of a protocol
between several parties where each party keeps its inputs secret.
– Uniqueness: For all nodes W, X, Y, Z such that ¬(W = X = Y = Z), LocalIDXW 6=
LocalIDZY with high probability.
– Indistinguishability : Adversary AOGen(·),OComp(·,·,·) = (A1,A2) has negligible advan-
tage in winning the game ExpindLocalID described below, that is to say the value
|Pr[ExpindLocalID(AOGen(·),OComb(·,·,·)) = 1]− 1/2| is negligible in the security param-
eter λ:
Game ExpindLocalID (A)
pp← Gen(1λ); (x(1)1 , y(1)), (x(2)1 , y(2))←↩ U(X × Y)
(x2, state)← A1(pp, y(1), y(2))
b∗ ←↩ U({0, 1}); LocalID∗ ← Comp(x(b∗)1 , x2, y(b
∗))
b← A2(state, LocalID∗)
Return b = b∗
– Computational One-Wayness: For an adversary A, the following probabilities are
negligible in λ.
Pr[pp← Gen(1λ) : A(1λ, pp, x2,Comp(x1, x2, y)) = y]
Pr[pp← Gen(1λ) : A(1λ, pp, x2, y,Comp(x1, x2, y)) = x1]
We now show that our structure of local identifiers indeed fulfills these properties.
Note that in our case, x1, x2 and y respectively correspond to dstD, srcX and IDD,
and that we want to prevent a node X who knows the value LocalIDXD from being able
to link it to y = IDD or to recover the value x1 = dstD.
The Pairness, Secrecy and Collaborative computation properties relate to the dy-
namics of the network. We can only argument them. For the 3 other properties, proof
sketches can be given. Pairness is trivially true: we use srcX which is generated and
belongs to X, and IDD and dstD which are generated and belong to D. Secrecy is
indeed verified because LocalIDXD is never seen in clear by any other node than X:
it is always encrypted, either by Elgamal either by link keys. Thus Secrecy relies on
the security of those encryptions. The only exception appears in the route proposition,
where D sees the values r.gdstD.srcX and r.LocalIDXD . But D learns nothing from this
value, because of the blinding factor r. Collaborative oblivious computation is also re-
spected: local identifiers are indeed collaboratively computed in the route proposition
and initialization. In the route proposition, srcX remains secret to X assuming the
discrete logarithm is a hard problem, and dstD and gdstD remain secret to D assuming
Elgamal is semantically secure. As for IDD, it remains secret if we manage to prove
the Computational one-wayness property. In the route initialization, dstD stays secret
to D by the security of the THE scheme with respect to S, and thanks to the blinding
factor r with respect to X. srcX stays secret by the security of Elgamal, and again
IDD is secret if Computational one-wayness holds.
Proof Sketch for Uniqueness. By reflexion on the birthday attack. It is know that, for
a function f : {0, 1}L → {0, 1}l with L > l, and a collection of uniformly distributed
elements x1, . . . , xk ∈ {0, 1}L, the probability that at least one of the pair (xi, xj) with
i 6= j is a collision is roughly p =
(
k
2
)
2−l. In our case, l = |q| ≈ 2λ, L = 3l, and k is
the number of distinct local identifiers in the network. As there are n nodes, and each
node has n local identifiers, k = n2. For a constant maximum number of nodes equal
to 106, the probability that two local identifiers are the same is:
p =
(
1012
2
)
2|q|
This value is indeed negligible in the security parameters λ. For example, when λ = 80,
p ≈ 2−80 and for λ = 128, p ≈ 2−180
Proof Sketch for Indistinguishability. As LocalIDXD = IDD.gsrcX .dstD can be seen as
an Elgamal encryption of IDD under key dstD and randomness scrX , it would be
convenient to borrow the semantic security proof of the scheme. However, it is not
possible, because in our case the adversary has access to additional knowledge. Indeed,
if the adversary is the node X, she knows srcX , which corresponds to the randomness
used for encryption if we consider LocalIDXD as an Elgamal encryption. Hence, we need
a different proof.
The idea is to show that, for a node X, given srcX of its choice, the identity of
two nodes IDD1 and IDD2 , and the value LocalID
X
D∗ (its local identifier for one of
D1 or D2), X can not know if LocalIDXD∗ is equal to LocalID
X
D1 or LocalID
X
D2 . Let’s
review the possibilities of X. She can proceed as follows: it begins by assuming the
local identifier is towards D1 and computes (assuming srcX and p− 1 are co-prime):
srcX
√
LocalIDXD∗
IDD1
= gdstD∗
(
IDD∗
IDD1
)1/srcX
= gdstD∗ .g(logIDD∗−logIDD1 )/srcX
In both cases, what X obtains is computationally indistinguishable from a uniformly
sampled element of G. Indeed, if D∗ = D1, X obtains gdstD1 which is uniformly dis-
tributed, because dstD1 is itself uniformly distributed (and unknown to X). And if
D∗ = D2, even though X can compute g(logIDD∗−logIDD1 )/srcX and obtain gdstD2 the
result is again uniformly distributed for the same reason. If X had assumed that D∗
was D2, the same argument applies.
The other possibility for X is to first divide by IDD1 and compute the root after-
wards. But the result is the same, and even though X may find gdstD∗ in several ways,
it can never confirm or refute its hypothesis and distinguish the two cases. So A can
not win the game with non-negligible probability.
Proof Sketch for Computation one-wayness. This property follows from the Indistin-
guishability property and from the hardness assumption of the discrete logarithm prob-
lem. Indeed, if we consider the first probability. If the adversary was able to recover
y with with non-negligible probability, she would win the game ExpindLocalID with non-
negligible probability (assuming Pr[y(1) = y(2)] is negligible, which is the case). Re-
garding the second probability, the adversary’s success is bounded by its ability to
compute a discrete logarithm.
Property 4 Route propositions are indistinguishable for AdvI. Because, locally, the
messages exchanged are the same in both cases, whether a route proposition emanated
from the destination itself or a proxy is indistinguishable for AdvI.
This property can also be modeled by a cryptographic game. We consider a setup
where either the node X is a direct neighbor to D, either there are one or several
nodes between X and D. We give the adversary the right to provoke at will as many
propositions as it wants, but not to change the network setting after the beginning
of the game. The goal of the adversary, of type AdvI and in the situation of X, is to
distinguish the two cases (finding out if the destination D of the proposition is a direct
neighbor or not). We assume that the adversary can not perform timing analysis. We
discuss this assumption in the paragraph concerning property 5.
Proof sketch. Informally, it is easy to show that from the point of view of X, and with-
out taking in account message transmission delays, the two cases are exactly the same.
Indeed, the number of messages received and emitted by X is respectively two and one
in both cases. Also, the respective size of the first, second and third messages are the
same in both cases. The first message contains the destination’s public key, a half of
DH handshake freshly (uniformly) generated, and a re-randomized ciphertext always
encrypting the same value. Assuming the re-randomization indeed outputs ciphertexts
uniformly distributed in the range of the encryption primitive, the distributions of the
first message in each case are computationally indistinguishable. The second message
is produced by X, and thus is not of interest here. Then, the third message contains a
link identifier and a symmetric encryption of r.LocalIDXD using the link key. The distri-
butions of the third message are thus also computationally indistinguishable, assuming
link identifiers are secure, and that the correct value r.LocalIDXD is always returned.
For a formal proof, it would be necessary to simulate and compare X’s views in the
two cases.
Property 5 If route propositions are indistinguishable for AdvI, if the encryption
schemes used are semantically secure, if the link identifiers are secure, and if we use
MIXing techniques in the route proposal, then up to a certain point, AdvII can not
distinguish whether a proposition emanated from the destination or a proxy.
Firstly, if AdvII does not perform traffic analysis but merely records the message
and only has a local view, she is not able to distinguish whether a route proposition
emanated from the destination itself or a proxy. By property 4, the respective distri-
butions of the first and third message are the same whether X is a direct neighbor to
D or not. And by the semantic security of the PKE scheme used, the re-randomization
property, and the uniform sampling of b (and thus gb), the distributions of second mes-
sage are also computationally indistinguishable. Now, if AdvII is able to perform traffic
analysis and has a global view, she can trace sequences of route proposals moving away
from the destination D. Thus, AdvII can distinguish when the route is proposed by the
destination itself or not. To thwart this, we can use message batching and reordering.
As a result, AdvII is no longer able to follow sequences of route proposals. However,
what we can not prevent are timing analysis. For a proxy at, say, 1 or 2 hops from D,
thanks to random delays, AdvII will have difficulties distinguishing the two cases using
differences in timings, as they will be small. However, the time required to go from X
to D and come back is much more important in the case X is at 4 or more hops from
D than in the case X is a direct neighbor. Thus, AdvII can not know if a proposition
emanates from a destination or a proxy, up to a certain number of hops.
Property 6 If local identifiers are secure, route initialization is oblivious for AdvI.
Indeed, S never makes the link between D and its value LocalIDSD, and V never learns
that the destination is D. In addition, the blinding factor r hides dstD and if the discrete
logarithm problem is hard, srcX is concealed.
In the same way as for the local identifiers, we formalize the security requirements
for route initialization. We say route initialization is secure if the following properties
hold:
– Obliviousness for S : S must not be able to link IDD with LocalIDSD.
– Obliviousness for X : X must not learn the destination that S considers.
– Secrecy : each party N should keep its values srcN , dstN , IDN and all the local
identifiers in its DRT secret to himself. D should keep its value dstD secret.
The two first properties are necessary for DMU to hold, while the third one ensures
the assumptions on the secret values src, dst and ID holds, and that the Secrecy of
local identifiers is conserved. We now prove that our route initialization fulfills these
properties.
Proof sketch for Obliviousness for S. We assume that the local identifiers are secure,
in the sense of property 3. Thus S can not a priori link IDD (or simply D) with
LocalIDSD because of the Indistinguishability property of local identifiers. Then, the
route initialization procedure do not give S any new element towards linking IDD.
Indeed, if the THE scheme is semantically secure, S does not learn anything from
the values C = THEnc(pk∗, dstD) and THDec(shS , C). And if Elgamal is semantically
secure, S does not learn anything from HEnc(pkX , gr.dstD.srcX ). At last, because we
assumed that every node has a route towards every other node in the network, the fact
that X knows a route towards D does not leak information.
For a formal proof, it would be necessary to simulate S’s view during the route
initialization.
Proof sketch for Obliviousness for X. We assume that the local identifiers are secure,
in the sense of property 3. Thus X can not a priori know that its value LocalIDXD
links to D. Then, thanks to the blinding factor r that acts as a one-time pad, X
does not learn anything from the decryption of C = THEnc(pk∗, r.dstD). Then, if the
re-randomization yields random-looking ciphertexts, X can not extract information
(in particular on r) from ReRand(pkX, ScMult(IDD, ScExp(C′, r−1 mod (p − 1)))). X
eventually learns LocalIDXD , but nothing else, and compared to the a priori case, X
has no more information on the link between IDD and LocalIDXD . Finally, although
it is not relevant in this proof, it is worth noting that if the secret share shS is not
publicly linked to S, even if the value THDec(shS , C) leaks information on shS , X can
not infer that the source is S.
For a formal proof, it would be necessary to simulate X’s view during the route
initialization.
Proof sketch for Secrecy. During the protocol, S keeps its values srcS , dstS and IDS ,
and its local identifiers secret simply because it does not use them. The same goes for
X’s values dstX and IDX , and all local identifiers of X (except LocalIDXD ). Then, the
values srcX , gsrcX and LocalIDXD are not disclosed assuming Elgamal is semantically
secure. Finally, as we consider honest-but-curious adversaries, S and X do not collude
and S indeed applies a scalar multiplication by a blinding factor r on THEnc(pk∗, dstD)
(and a re-randomization). Therefore, dstD is ensured to stay secret to D.
For a formal proof, it would be necessary to simulate the view of S and X during
the route initialization.
Property 7 If we use MIXing techniques, and if link identifiers are secure, route
initialization is indistinguishable from standard communication for AdvII.
This property is quite trivial. Messages exchanged between S and X in the route
initialization are encrypted with link keys and addressed via link identifiers, just as in a
regular communication. Therefore, if the link identifiers are secure in the sense of prop-
erty 2, an external observer is unable to see the difference between route initialization
and regular communication. The only possibility for the observer is to fingerprint the
route initialization protocol by simulating runs of this protocol and measuring average
timings between messages or other metrics. Then, the observer could possibly identify
routes initialization in the network, because the sequence of messages exchanged is
different from standard communication in general. We introduce MIXing techniques
in the route initialization, so that obtaining a precise fingerprint is difficult for the
adversary.
B.3 Privacy goals
This section shows that our protocol achieves our actual privacy goals. From now on,
we assume that the seven properties from the previous section are ensured. Also, as
a general remark, note that AdvII has very little power thanks to the link identifier
structure (assuming they are secure). Indeed, all messages are encrypted and locally
addressed with link identifiers in an anonymous way. Furthermore, for a given message,
its appearance changes at each hop, and for a given link, the symmetric encryption key
changes at each message. And also, because we assume messages are of fixed size, AdvII
can not learn anything on the contents of messages and can not trace them.
SMU against AdvI This property is quite simply verified. Locally, when a node
receives a message on some link, it can not know if the node at the other end of the link
acts as source or relay (notably because all nodes may be source or relay). Furthermore,
the contents of the messages do not give any information on the source, either directly
(e.g. its identity) or indirectly (e.g. the number of hops from the source).
SMU against AdvII If property 7 holds, AdvII can not detect a route initialization,
and she can not know which nodes initiate communications by this mean. However,
it is not sufficient. Indeed, using the simple heuristic that a node emitting a message
without prior solicitation is a sender, AdvII can locate sources (but not learn their
identities). Even though the chances of locating sources are reduced when traffic is
dense and when MIXing techniques are employed, if AdvII notices that a node receives
k messages in some time frame and emits k + 1 messages afterwards, she will infer
that the node is a source. The feasibility of this attack is however uncertain. Especially
in broadcast networks such as ad-hoc networks (or more generally, wireless networks):
if each node locally broadcasts its messages (either as a source or as a relay) and if
we make use of secure link identifiers to address neighbors, AdvII can not count the
number of messages received by a given node. Therefore, she can not compare the
number of incoming and outgoing messages from a node nor locate sources.
DMU against AdvI First, if local identifiers are secure (property 3), they do not
reveal the destination they are pointing to. Secondly, if property 4 holds, route propo-
sitions do not let the receiver of the proposition know who the actual destination of the
proposition is. Then, if property 6 holds, route initialization does not leak information
to X about the destination intended by S, and S does not learn that LocalIDSD relates
to D. At last, it is necessary to assume that the PKE scheme used to encrypt payload
messages is receiver-anonymous [15]. Indeed, the permanent public keys are publicly
linked to their owners, and in general, ciphertexts of PKE schemes leak information on
the encryption key. Thus, forwarding nodes may learn the identity of the destination.
In receiver-anonymous PKE schemes, it is ensured that no information is leaked by
ciphertexts on the encryption key.
DMU against AdvII Firstly, if property 5 holds, AdvII can not learn the destina-
tion of a route proposition by observing the route proposition protocol. Then, if link
identifiers are secure, AdvII can not trace messages to their destination. However, in
the same way that she locates sources, AdvII can locate destination. To thwart desti-
nation localization, destination nodes can simulate a relay upon receiving a message.
A possible way to do so, is for a destination to create a fake message containing solely
a TTL-like number and padding. The TTL may take a value between 0 and 2 for in-
stance, randomly chosen. The destination sends this value on a random route chosen
in its DRT. The addressed neighbor, upon receiving the fake message, if the TTL value
is greater than 0, decreases it by 1 and forwards it on a random route as well. When
the TTL reaches 0, the message is discarded. As a result, to the knowledge of AdvII,
the possible receivers of a given message are the node that received k messages in some
time frame but emitted k− 1 messages afterwards, along with its 3 hop neighborhood.
SDU against AdvI and AdvII This property is quite straightforward: if SMU
holds against some adversary, then the source of a communication is unknown and
SDU holds. The same goes for DMU. Therefore, if either SMU or DMU hold, SDU
holds.
MMU against AdvI This follows from property 1 stating that routes are disjoint.
Indeed, in Fig. 4, a locally corrupted Z is actually completely unable to distinguish
a message from S1 and a message from S2. Because it only has a local view of the
network, given an incoming link identifier, Z does not know if this link is used by one
upstream source only or by several ones. Therefore, even though Z may know that two
messages are meant for the same destination, it does not know if it comes from the
same source, and can not infer that those messages belong to the same communication.
However, in the route initialization example from Fig. 3, an adversary of type I who
corrupted X is able to break MMU. Indeed, it knows that all messages come from the
same source and are for the same destination. This vulnerability is acceptable because
X does not know the identity of S and D.
MMU against AdvII For this property to hold, link identifiers must be secure
(property 2). A noted above, AdvII is unable to learn any information on the contents
of messages, can not trace them, and thus can not relate two messages. The only
information AdvII can infer is that two messages going though the same link may
belong to the same communication. But she can not be sure of it, thanks to property 1.
B.4 Remark
Our argumentations does not consider the auxiliary information that the adversary
may have. For instance, the adversary might know that some node is a privileged
destination, maybe because it is the only one routing messages to Internet. As AdvII
can detect traffic patterns, she will easily locate this node: it will be the target of a
considerable amount of traffic. There are many other examples of the same sort. Taking
into account the adversary’s auxiliary information is part of future work.
C (Imp)possibilities for route initialization
In Sect. 4.1, we discussed the necessity of universal auxiliary information to enable se-
cure and efficient route initialization. This appendix explicits what we mean by “secure
and efficient”, and why, in our model, our claim is true. As starting point, we assume
the topology is disseminated and consider the local identifiers in their abstract descrip-
tion from property 3 in Appendix B, assuming they are secure. In other words, this
section does not consider any particular instantiation for the local identifier structure.
We already addressed the notion of security for route initialization in property 6
from Appendix B. We measure efficiency according to the number of nodes in the
network. As we will see in this appendix, there is a (relatively) trivial way for S and
X (in our example in Fig. 3) to find the value LocalIDXD in X’s DRT. The idea is to
make a sort of exhaustive search in both S and X’s DRTs. The cost of this solution
in term of computation and communication is quadratic in the number of nodes n in
the network: its complexity is O(n2). We consider reducing this complexity: we are
interested in solutions which cost is linear in n or even constant , i.e. in O(n) or O(1)
with respect to the number of nodes.
According to our results, there exists solutions with such complexities, under par-
ticular assumptions. The below claims and their proof sketches capture our results.
Claim 1. A secure solution for route initialization in O(n2) is possible (against a PPT
honest but curious adversary).
Proof Sketch. The proof consists in exhibiting a route initialization protocol with cost
O(n2), and to show it is secure (according to our definition). A possible, highly in-
efficient solution is depicted in sub-protocol 2, where “∀ N ∈ DRTX” denotes all the
entries of X’s DRT for all destinations N. Clearly, the cost of this solution is linear
in the number of different local identifiers in the DRT of S, and linear in the number
those in the DRT of X. That is to say, it is quadratic in n.
The correctness of the protocol is easily checked: the value testN,M is indeed equal
to 1 if N = M = D. In every other case, the probability that the plaintext in equation
(2) is equal to 1 is roughly 1/|G|. Now, we argue that the security properties of route
initialization hold for this sub-protocol.
Globally, the obliviousness for S , the obliviousness for X and the secrecy properties
rely on the semantic security of the HE scheme used. Indeed, both S and X mainly
manipulate ciphertexts. There are however exceptions that might compromise security:
– X sees in the clear the values (LocalIDXM )srcS for all M. But it learns nothing new
from them if the discrete logarithm is a hard problem.
– S sees in the clear the values textN,M for all N and M. However, because the
identities and the src and dst values are randomly distributed, and because X
processes the aux2(S,M) and aux2(X,N) in random order, the values testN,M
are indistinguishable from random for S.
This concludes the argument. Proofs by simulation using standard hybrid argu-
ments (one for S, one for X) are necessary to formally prove our claim.
Claim 2. A secure solution for route initialization in O(1), without universal auxiliary
information, is impossible (against a PPT honest but curious adversary).
Proof Sketch. By contradiction. Imagine that a secure and correct protocol P exists
for a route initialization in O(1), without using universal auxiliary information.
In a solution with complexity O(1) (w.r.t. n), we forbid the scanning of both S and
X’s DRTs. Therefore, the respective inputs of the protocol can be described as:
– S’s input contains x1,S , x2,S , yS . It can contain: dynamically generated values such
as cryptographic keys, and auxiliary values related to D (because we assume D
communicated information to S prior to network setup). It can not contain: uni-
versal auxiliary information on the network.
– X’s input contains: x1,X , x2,X , yX . It can contain: dynamically generated values
such as cryptographic keys. It can not contain: universal auxiliary information on
the network, nor any auxiliary information on D (indeed, X does not know a priori
which node is S’s intended destination).
We denote the union of S and X’s inputs by InS ∪ InX . Now, there are two possi-
bilities: either InS ∪ InX contains the necessary material to compute LocalIDXD using
protocol P, either it does not. In the latter case, we reach a contradiction because
we supposed that P was correct. And if InS ∪ InX allows computation of LocalIDXD ,
then we also reach a contradiction: S can compute by itself LocalIDSD, thus making
the link between D and LocalIDSD and breaking the Obliviousness for S property of
route initialization (and, ultimately, S breaks DMU as explained in Sect. 4.1). Indeed, if
InS ∪InX can lead to LocalIDXD , this means that x1,D, x2,X , yD ∈ InS ∪InX , because
LocalIDXD = Comp3(yD,Comp2(x2,X ,Comp1(x1,D))). However, X’s inputs can not
contain information on D. This implies that x1,D and yD come from S’s inputs. There-
fore, in S’s inputs, there is the necessary material to compute LocalIDSD = Comp3(yD,
Comp2(x2,S ,Comp1(x1,D))). Said otherwise, S can run the protocol P playing both roles
in order to obtain LocalIDSD. This is because X’s input, with respect to LocalIDXD ,
does not contain anything more than S’s input with respect to LocalIDSD.
Claim 3. There exists a secure solution for route initialization in O(1), assuming
the existence of universal auxiliary information (against a PPT honest but curious
adversary).
Proof Sketch. To prove this claim, it is sufficient to exhibit a particular solution for
route initialization in O(1) that uses universal auxiliary information and is secure.
We already provided such a solution in the description of our protocol: the route
initialization described in Sect 3.3 indeed uses universal auxiliary information (under
the form of secret shares of sk∗) and runs in constant time with respect to the number
of nodes in the network (indeed, no DRT or any table is used). Therefore, this claim
follows directly from the proof sketch of property 6 in Appendix B.
In the above claims, we did not address the case of solutions in O(n), linear in the
number of nodes. Actually, it seems that the same claims as for the constant case hold:
a solution in O(n) is possible only using universal auxiliary information. Indeed, we
reach the same case, where S is able to run the protocol playing both roles in order
to obtain LocalIDSD. We did not further study solutions in complexity O(n) because
their interest is limited. Indeed, they seem to yield less efficient solutions for the same
strong assumption as the solutions in complexity O(1).
Protocol 2 S initiates a connection towards D with help of X in O(n2)
1: S → X : HEnc(pkS , IDD),HEnc(pkS , IDsrcSD ), ∀N ∈ DRTS ,HEnc(pkS , LocalIDSN )
2: X → S : ∀M ∈ DRTX ,HEnc(pkX , LocalIDXM )
For all M, S computes ScExp(HEnc(pkX , LocalIDXM ), srcS)
= HEnc(pkX , ID
srcS
M .g
srcX .dstM .srcS )
3: S → X : ∀M,HEnc(pkX , IDsrcSM .gsrcX .dstM .srcS ) (in the same order as received)
For all M, X decrypts the value received and re-encrypts it under pkS
(This step is necessary to perform the following homomorphic operations on ciphertexts).
X computes aux1(X) = ScExp(HEnc(pkS , IDD), srcX) = HEnc(pkS , IDsrcXD )
Denote by aux1(S) the value HEnc(pkS , IDsrcSD ) from message 1
For all N, X computes aux2(X,N) = ScExp(HEnc(pkS , LocalIDSN ), srcX)
= HEnc(pkS , ID
srcX
N .g
srcS .dstN .srcX )
Denote by aux2(S,M) the values from message 3
4: While X did not receive STOP from S, for all M, in random order, X computes
and sends, for all N:
testN,M =
aux1(S).aux2(X,N)
aux1(X).aux2(S,M)
(1)
= HEnc
(
pkS ,
IDsrcXN
IDsrcSM
.
IDsrcSD
IDsrcXD
.g(dstN−dstM ).srcX .srcS
)
(2)
= 1 if N = M = D, and a random value otherwise (3)
X → S : HEnc(pkS , testN,M )
5: S → X : STOP if testN,M = 1
X infers that LocalIDXM is the local identifier sought for.
